Wade & Bolton: Fundamental Legal Errors and Dangerous Implications by Robert M. Byrn
The Catholic Lawyer 
Volume 19 
Number 4 Volume 19, Autumn 1973, Number 4 Article 3 
March 2017 
Wade & Bolton: Fundamental Legal Errors and Dangerous 
Implications 
Robert M. Byrn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert M. Byrn (1973) "Wade & Bolton: Fundamental Legal Errors and Dangerous Implications," The 
Catholic Lawyer: Vol. 19 : No. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/tcl/vol19/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Catholic Lawyer by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 





On January 22, 1973, in the companion cases of Roe v. Wade' and Doe
v. Bolton,2 the Supreme Court of the United States overturned, as an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of personal privacy, the anti-
abortion statutes of Texas and Georgia. The Court found that unborn
children are not Fourteenth Amendment persons at any time during gesta-
tion; that the state has no compelling interest in the protection of unborn
children until viability, which the Court put at 28 weeks and perhaps
earlier, "even at 24 weeks"; 3 that during the first trimester of pregnancy,
the State may not interfere with the effectuation of a decision to abort
reached by a woman and her physician (exercising his medical judgment);'
that after the first trimester, a state may regulate abortion to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection
of maternal health; ' and that after viability, the state may effectuate its
compelling interest in "protecting the potentiality of life" (93 S. Ct. 731)
by prescribing abortion subject to an exception for abortions necessary to
preserve the life or health of the pregnant woman.' Health was defined in
Bolton to include "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial
. . . relevant to the well-being of the patient." 7 Obviously, it will be a rare
medical abortionist who cannot justify his fee under this definition of
health.
In short, under Wade, the unborn child is not a Fourteenth Amend-
ment person-he is not a live human being-he has, for practical purposes,
t Reprinted by permission of copyright holder from Fordham Law Review, Volume 41, pp.
807-862. Business Office: Fordham Law Review, Lincoln Center, 140 West 62nd Street, New
York, N.Y. 10023. (c) 1973 by Fordham University Press.
* Professor of Law, Fordham University. B.S. 1953, L.L.B. 1959, Fordham University.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).





7 410 U.S. at 192.
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been deprived of all legal protection and a state is free to legalize his killing
up to birth.
Justice Rehnquist and White, in dissent, did not quarrel with the
majority holding that unborn children are not Fourteenth Amendment
persons. Their dissents are essentially on "states' rights" grounds.
Wade and Bolton arose out of challenges to the abortion statutes of
Texas and Georgia. A three-judge Federal District Court had declared the
Texas abortion statutes unconstitutional on privacy and vagueness
grounds but had refused to issue an injunction against enforcement." The
Georgia abortion statute had suffered a similar fate before a three-judge
court which placed its decision on privacy grounds only Appellants in the
Supreme Court were the plaintiffs below, appealing (a) the denial of the
injunctions in both cases and (b) in Bolton, so much of the District Court's
decision as left standing certain statutory procedural and medical require-
ments as pre-conditions to abortion.
The Texas statutes permitted abortion only "for the purpose of saving
the life of the mother."'" The Georgia statutes added preservation of mater-
nal health, grave fetal defect and rape as exceptions to criminal abortion."
The Supreme Court's substantive holdings are contained almost ex-
clusively in Wade and I should like to concentrate mainly on this decision,
passing over the Court's discussion therein of jurisdiction, justiciability,
standing and abstention. 2
I would note parenthetically that the Supreme Court did not strike
down a "conscience" clause in the Georgia abortion status,"3 nor did it pass
on the rights of the father of an unborn child or the parents of a minor
pregnant girl to object to the abortion decision. 4
I. The Fundamental Errors in Wade: In General
Upon analysis, it becomes evident that the structure of the Court's
opinion in Wade is defective. The Court agreed that if the Fourteenth
Amendment personhood of the unborn child were established, "the appel-
lant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaran-
teed specifically by the Amendment.' 5 Hence, the approach of the Court
should have been to decide: (a) whether the unborn child, as a matter of
fact, is a live human being, (b) whether all live human beings are "per-
sons" within the fourteenth amendment, and (c) whether, in light of the
Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
314 F. Supp. at 1223.
GA. COnE ANN. ch. 26 § 26-1202 (1971).
2 410 U.S. at 123-29.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 165 n.67.
Id. at 156-57.
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answers to (a) and (b), the state has a compelling interest in the protection
of the unborn child; or to put it another way, whether there are any other
interests of the state which would justify denying to the unborn child the
law's protection of his life. instead, the Court reversed the inquiry, decid-
ing first that the right of privacy includes a right to abort, then decided
that the unborn child is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and finally, refusing to resolve the factual question of
whether an abortion kills a live human being. In effect, the Court raised
a presumption against the (constitutional) personality of unborn children
and then made it irrebuttable by refusing to decide the basic factual
issue of prenatal human-beingness.
The refusal to resolve the threshold question of the fact at the outset
is the crucial error in Wade. This fundamental error may have been caused
by the Court's misapprehension of the common law of abortion and the
motivation behind early American anti-abortion statutes. This, in turn,
apparently led the Court to forego researching the intent of the framers of
the fourteenth Amendment: to bring within the aegis of the due process
and equal protection clauses every member of the human race, regardless
of age, imperfection, or condition of unwantedness. Left without any relia-
ble historical basis for constitutional interpretation, the Court both failed
to allude to its own prior explication of "person" under section one of the
fourteenth amendment and mistook the general status in law of unborn
children. Further, it adverted to a number of criteria which it erroneously
interpreted as proof that the unborn child is not a person at all under the
fourteenth amendment. In short, error was piled upon error.'"
II. The Historical Errors
Even a cursory reading of Wade leads to the inevitable conclusion that
the Court was deeply influenced by its own interpretation of the Anglo-
American history of the law of abortion. Unfortunately the Court's under-
standing of history is both distorted and incomplete.
A. The Common Law
The Court painted a picture of a common law "right" to abort, at least
prior to quickening, and perhaps up to birth.'7 The Court erred. A detailed
examination of the common law is not possible in the time alloted here.'8
The more plausible view of the common law is this: (a) even the earliest
common law cases do not support the proposition that abortion was re-
garded as a "liberty" or "freedom" or "right" of the pregnant woman or
" Id. at 156-59.
I7 d. at 132, 135, 138.
" For such an examination of the common law, see Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Su-
preme Court on Abortion, 41 FORD. L. REV. 807 (1973).
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anyone else; (b) "quickening" was utilized in the later common law as a
practical evidentiary test to determine whether the abortion had been an
assault upon the live human being in the womb; this evidentiary test was
never intended as a judgment that before quickening the child was not a
live human being (indeed, in all other areas of the law-unencumbered by
the evidentiary requirements of the criminal law-he was precisely that)
and (c) at all times, the common law disapproved of abortion as malum
in se and sought to protect the child in the womb from the moment his
living biological existence could be proved.
B. The Early American Statutes
Here again the Supreme Court attempted to denigrate traditional
respect for unborn human life. The Court concluded that nineteenth cen-
tury American anti-abortion statutes were intended solely to protect the
pregnant woman against a dangerous medical procedure and were not
meant to protect the life of the unborn child. 9 The best that can be said
of his conclusion is that it is absolutely wrong. All but the most superficial
research would have revealed to the Court that the New Jersey abortion
statute was amended in 1872 specifically to protect the unborn child by
providing equal penalties for the death of the aborted child and the preg-
nant woman.2" Other courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century specifically held that protection of the child's life was at least one
of the purposes of their respective state's abortion statutes." One might
fairly add to this list decisions which, in the context of the enforcement of
abortion laws, refer to the lives of unborn children as "sacred" and "ina-
lienable. 2 2 Had the Court been interested in cases beyond the early twen-
tieth century and before the abortion "reform" movement of the nineteen
sixties, it might have referred to several other cases.23
In none of these decisions was quickening a factor. The Court was as
wrong about the intent of early American anti-abortion statutes as it was
about the common law.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court admitted that "[tihe anti-abortion mood preva-
410 U.S. at 151, citing State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (1858).
" State v. Gedicke, 43 N.J.L. 86, 90 (Sup. Ct. 1881).
Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 487, 73 So. 834, 836 (1916); Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo.
514, 522 (1872); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879 (1913); State v. Auspland,
86 Ore. 121, 132, 167 P. 1019, 1022 (1917); State v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380, 399 (1859).
22 State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135-36 (1863). See People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 596, 26
N.W. 291, 293 (1886).
:1 Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 117, 54 P.2d 666, 668 (1936); Anderson v. Common-
wealth, 190 Va. 665, 673, 58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1950); State v. Cox, 197 Wash. 67, 77, 84 P.2d
357, 361 (1938).
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lent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical
profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have played a signifi-
cant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion legislation during
that period."24 In 1859 and again in 1871, the AMA condemned abortion
at every stage of gestation as the destruction of a living human being.25 By
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, 28 out of the 37
states proscribed abortion prior to quickening either by statute or by inter-
pretation of the common law. Within 15 years that number rose to 35 out
of 38 and, as we have already seen by the overwhelming weight of author-
ity, one of the purposes of these statutes, at the very least, was the protec-
tion of the life of the unborn child.
Protection of all human beings was the purpose of section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congressman John A. Bingham who sponsored
the Amendment in the House of Representatives, noted that it was "uni-
versal" and applied to "any human being."26 Congressman Bingham's
counterpart in the Senate, Senator Jacob Howard, emphasized that the
Amendment applied to every member of the human race including "the
humblest, the poorest, the most despised." 7
The Court in Wade made no reference to the expressed intent of the
framers. It did not explain how, in an era characterized by an "anti-
abortion mood," '28 by the proliferation of statutes intended to protect un-
born children from abortion, by a war fought to vindicate the fundamental
equality of every human being, and by outraged medical protests against
the destruction of unborn human life,-in this era the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the states that ratified it could possibly have
intended to create sub silentio an unarticulated right of privacy which
includes the right to destroy a whole class of human beings whom the
framers intended to exclude from the Fourteenth Amendment. Perhaps the
reason for the lack of explanation is that none exists.
III. Human Life Errors
The Wade Court's historical errors were compounded by equally erro-
neous holdings on the question of whether the unborn child is a human
being in fact and a human person in modern law.
A. The Failure to Resolve the Crucial Question of Fact
The Court in Wade observed that "we need not resolve the difficult
410 U.S. at 141.
2 Id. at 141-42.
CONe,. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
z Id. at 2766.
410 U.S. at 141.
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question of when life begins. 2 9 But the Court erred at the threshold when
it failed to determine whether an individual life has already begun before
an abortion takes place. There is a "long course of judicial construction
which establishes as a principle that the duty rests on this Court to decide
for itself facts or constructions upon which federal constitutional issues
rest."311
The Court noted, in justification of its position, a lack of "consensus"
on the point." However, the lack of consensus is not on the fact of life
before birth-that is established beyond dispute by medical scientific evi-
dence-but on the value of unborn human life. And that value judgment
was made over 100 years ago by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Failure to Allude to the Court's Own Explication of "Person"
Under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Levy v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court identified the human per-
sons protected by the equal protection clause as those who are "human,
live and have their being. 3 2 Further, in matters touching constitutional
concepts of equality, government is not free to ignore the relevant "biologi-
cal relationships. ' 33 Had the Court adverted to Levy, it would have been
required to find that unborn children, all of whom are human, live and
have their being, are, by that fact alone, Fourteenth Amendment persons.
C. Misunderstanding of the General Status in Law of Unborn Children.
Touching briefly on tort and property law, the Wade Court concluded
that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense. 34 The more startling error is the Court's complete omission
even to mention those cases in which, contrary to purported rights of free
religious exercise and personal and family privacy, courts have ordered
blood transfusions of pregnant women to save the lives of their unborn
children because the children "are entitled" to the law's protection. 5
Given the circumstances of these cases, only the unborn child's rights (as
"' Id. at 159.
Napue v. Ill., 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959), quoting Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S.
110, 121 (1954).
410 U.S. at 159.
391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968), citing Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76
HARV. L. REV. 337 (1962).
Glona v. Am. Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
410 U.S. at 162. The unequivocal status of the unborn child as a legal person in these areas
of law has been analyzed at length. See, e.g., Note, The Law and The Unborn Child: The
Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 N.D. LAW. 349, 351-60 (1971).
:: Estate of Warner, No. 71 P. 3861 (Cir. Ct., Cook City, Ill., May 5, 1971); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985
(1964); cf. Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
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a legal person) to live and to the law's protection could have justified the
Court's decisions.
To go on with the Supreme Court's errors would consume the rest of
the morning. I have analyzed elsewhere"6 certain gratuitous statements by
the Court :7 intended as negative criteria of the unborn child's personhood.
Wade has a veneer of scholarship but it is only that and nothing more.
Beneath the surface, there is little that is not error.
IV. The Dangerous Implications
The errors in Wade are fundamental; the implications of the opinion
are frightening.
A. Compulsory Abortion
It must be remembered that the Court in Wade rejected any absolute
right of a woman to choose whether or not to abort, and premised its
holding on a limited right of privacy, subordinate to compelling state inter-
ests.31 As one example of an appropriate state limitation on the right of
privacy, the Court cited Buck v. Bell39 which upheld the validity of a state
statute providing for compulsory sterilization of mental defectives whose
affliction is hereditary. The State "interest" in that situation was, of
course, in preventing the proliferation of defectives.
It has been thought that Buck v. Bell died after the Nazi experience,
and its revival now is rather frightening. By implication in Wade, the
Court espoused the constitutional validity of state-imposed, compulsory
abortion of unborn children diagnosed intrautero as mentally defective.
Neither the child's constitutional rights (of which the Court could find
none) nor the mother's right of privacy (which the Court, by citing Buck,
found limited by the state's "interest" in preventing the birth of mental
defectives) could, according to the theory of Wade, be interposed to chal-
lenge such a statute.
B. Involuntary Euthanasia
Also very real and very frightening is the prospect of involuntary eu-
thanasia. The Court in Wade refused to "resolve the difficult question of
when life begins [because] medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus, '40 even though the Court expressed its aware-
ness of "the well-known facts of fetal development."'" As previously
:1 Byrn, supra note 18.
'7 410 U.S. at 157 nn.53 & 54.
1 Id. at 155-56.
274 U.S. 200 (1927).
410 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 156.
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pointed out, the controversy to which the Court referred involves not
whether abortion kills a live human being, but whether that live human
being is worth keeping alive or, to put it another way, whether he may be
killed with impunity. The determination is not a factual one but a value
judgment on whether the life of a human being, distinguishable from other
human beings only by kind and degree of dependency, is meaningful. Thus
in Wade, the Court held: "With respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the 'compelling point' is at viability.
This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb.""
The same kind of controversy might very well arise with respect to the
end of life. Because of illness, age or incapacity, a live human being,
indistinguishable from other live human beings except by kind and degree
of dependency, might be claimed by some in the disciplines of medicine,
philosophy and theology to be no longer alive in a "meaningful" way.
Given a carefully orchestrated controversy and the Court's unwilling-
ness in Wade to recognize the fact of life unless there is a "consensus" on
its value, a state might persuasively claim that it is free to remove a live
human being (e.g., a senile elderly person) from the law's protection. Just
as the Wade Court redefined the beginning of life as a "process,"43 so too
might death be viewed as a process which may be hastened by those who
find that the care of a dependent live human being has forced upon them
(as the Court said of the unwanted child in Wade) "a distressful life and
future.""
Conclusion
Three generations of Americans have witnessed Supreme Court decis-
ims which have explicitly degraded a whole class of fellow human beings
to something less in law than "persons in the whole sense." One generation
was present at Dred Scott v. Sandford,4' another at Buck v. Bell, and now
a third at Roe v. Wade. Three generations of error are more than enough.
And the last shall be called the worst.
12 Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
Id. at 161.
"Id. at 153.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
